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The Christian Democratic Union/Christian 
Social Union in Opposition: 
From Elitism to Pluralism 
]ACK D. DOWELL 
Washington State University 
One of the most significant political developments in the West 
German Federal Republic has been the emergence of a near-majority 
party, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/ 
CSU). After World War II Catholic trade union leaders joined moderate 
and conservative political leaders in creating what was for Germany a 
new kind of political organization, a synergetic "people's party." To an 
unpreced ented degree the new party surmounted the economic, social 
and denominational sectarianism which had produced the ineffective 
multiparty systems of Bismarck's Reich and the Weimar Republic . After 
the first national election in 1949, CDU /CSU-dominated cabinets led 
the Federal Republic to economic prosperity and a prestigious position 
within the Atlantic community. As a result, the party enjoyed spectacular 
gains at the polls as fam1ers and the m-ban middle class gradually 
abandoned the smaller parties farther to the right on the political 
spectrum. 
However, in recent years the party's voter appeal his suffered as it 
has groped for solutions to West Germany's new domestic and inter-
national problems. After having to accept West Germany's second major 
party, the Social Democrats, as partners in a Grand Coalition ( 1966-
1969), the Christian Democrats were finally forced from national office 
as a result of the General Election of 1969. For the :first time in the 
Republic's twenty year history, th e Social Democrats formed a Govern-
ment, although they needed a coalition with the one remaining minor 
party, the Free Democrats, to secure a parliamentary majority . And of 
course that Government, now led by Chanc ellor Helmut Schmidt, re-
mains in power today, after being returned to office in 1972 and 1976. 
The CDU /CSU's problems am complicated by its unusual formal 
structure. It is in fact two parties, except in the Bundestag, the lower 
house of the national legislature. The Christian Democratic Union, the 
focal point of this paper, is almost a nation-wide party, with the cus-
tomary national organs plus regional and local units in every state but 
Bavaria. There, however, it is the CSU which is the dominant party, 
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maintaining its. own organization, with its own party congress and 
chairman. Only in the Bundestag do deputies of both parties form a 
united caucus, with a single chairman and executive committee. And 
even there the CSU deputies function as a disciplined bloc, in effect 
as a "caucus" within a caucus. 
Like all political parties which have lost national elections, the 
CDU /CSU has engaged in self-examination, even self flagellation, dur-
ing the five and one-half years it has been in opposition. Numerous 
individuals and groups within the organization have agonized over its 
leadership problems, its diminished appeal to the electorate, and the 
power relationships among its various organs-the separate party con-
gresses and chairmen, and the joint parliamentary caucus with its chair-
man. 
As we analyze the structure of power within the CDU we can utilize 
the familiar concepts of elitism and pluralism. As we know, elitists 
hold that decision-making will inevitably be concentrated in the hands 
of a leader or small group of leaders, while pluralists argue that deci-
sions are the product of compromises and bargains struck by numerous 
and competing groups. 
Currently, both schools of thought have energetic and articulate 
supporters among Christian Democrats. The argument is familiar, focus-
ing as it does upon the distribution of power between the extra-paria-
mentary organization and those of its leaders who hold public office. 
On the one hand, some defend an avowedly elitist position: the party 
should remain a loosely organized, decentralized electoral machine, 
without a direct role in decision-making. The extra-parliamentary organi-
zation should support unhesitatingly its leaders in the legislative and 
executive branches, and permit them wide flexibility on policy issues. 
On the other band, there are those in the party, popularly termed 
the "reformers," who argue that if the party is to survive these bitter 
years in opposition, it must build a more tightly knit organizational 
structure at all levels. Salaried employees should replace regional and 
local party notables. Active party units should be organized in the 
smallest and most remote communities of the Federal Republic. The 
central organs of the extra-parliamentary party should be strengthened 
and given sufficient authority to hold the party together in these times 
of adversity . And, most important, when the CDU /CSU regains national 
office, the party organization should play an active role in policy-making, 
even vis-a-vis its own chancellor and parliamentary caucus. 1 
1 For an extended discussion of the "reformist" position, still applicable to the 
party's problems, see Anton Bohm, "Doch Keine Testwahl," Die Politische Meinung 
9 Jahrgang (Mai, 1964), 6-9. 
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From 1949 until 1963, while Konrad Adenauer was both leader of 
the party and Chancellor of the Federal Republic , most commentator s 
agreed that the party 's internal distribution of power was decidely 
elitist.2 His authority was sufficient to maintain him at the pinnacle of 
the Government and to hold together the rival factions and leaders 
within his own party. Both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
organs of th e party were united in their desire to remain in public 
office and in th eir knowledge that Adenauer's electoral app eal guarantee d 
that felicitous status quo. The Chancellor could rely upon the CDU / 
CSU parliamentary deputies for complete support , especially on ques-
tions of foreign policy and defense. And, because attention was focused 
upon the dramatic quarrels between the Government and its opposition 
over such issues as NATO, rearmament and reunification, the publi c 
tended to denigrate both th e parliamentary caucus and th e party organi-
zation as spineless organs, dominated by the Chancellor and playing 
almost no significant role in the decision-making process. 
Of course, even during the period of Adenauer's greatest ascendency 
over the party, the influence of the parliamentary caucus , particular ly 
on domestic issues, was more extensive than was generally recognize d. 
Neither the extra-parliam entary organization nor the legislative caucus 
followed his wishes blindly , without doubts, without opposition. Here 
the Chancellor had to tread a cautious path among the competing 
groups and inter ests repres ented in both party and caucus. CDU /CSU 
parliamentarians , speaking for such disparate groups as industrial work-
ers, farmers , middle classes, and industrialists, sometimes refused to 
support cabinet bills; if they could not compel the cabinet to withdra w 
an objectionable proposal , they were more often successful in securing 
important amendments desired by the interest groups they represente d. 3 
However , the interest groups supporting the party, and their spokes-
men within the caucus, agreed that the overriding importance of staying 
in power required coherent leadership, effective policies, even some 
sacrifices. And they usually recognized Adenauer's right to detennine 
the final shape of public policy. To the extent, then , that the CDU /CS U 
caucus and parties accepted Adenauer's role as ultimate decision maker, 
we may fairly describe the distribution of power during those years as 
approaching the elitist model. 
But the CDU has had leadership problems since Adenauer gave up 
both his governmental and party offices. Neither Ludwig Erhard nor 
2 For example, see Ri.idiger Altmann, Das Erbe Adenauers ( Stuttgart: Seewald 
Verlag, 1960), pp. 25-60. 
3 The preceding analysis owes much to the detailed work of Ji.irgen Domes, 
Mehrheitsfraktion und Bundesregierung (Koln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), passim. 
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Kurt Georg Kiesinger, who followed Adenauer as party chairmen and 
Heads of Government, were strong leaders. Neither could successfully 
overcome the party's internal conflicts or enunciate persuasive new 
policies. And the squabbling among rival leaders and groups, and the 
controversies over the distribution of power within the organization, 
have redoubled since the party entered into opposition in 1969. 
Kiesinger, who led the Grand Coalition, always understood his posi-
tion to be Chancellor of the Federal Republic and , by virtue of that 
fact, Chairman of the CDU as well. Like Adenauer and Erhard before 
him, Kiesinger wanted the party chairmanship primarily to protect 
himself. He was concerned lest the power that he had won elsewhere, 
that is, in the caucus and in the government, should be open to chal-
lenge at party headquarters. 4 When he failed to win a return ticket to 
the Chancellorship in the autumn of 1969 he had to all intents and 
purposes also lost the leadership of the CDU. True , the party observed 
the amenities; the ex-chancellor was permitted to remain as party chair-
man for decent interval. But he quickly learned that that office alone 
does not have the authority or integrative power that it has when com-
bined with the Chancellorship. 5 
Most important, Kiesinger was unable to capture the chairmanship of 
the joint CDU /CSU parliamentary caucus. Rainer Barzel, who had led 
the party's legislative forces during the years of the Grand Coalition, 
adjusted rapidly to the role of opposition leader in the Bundestag and 
successfully defended his claim to that position. Once firmly enb·enched 
as leader of the CDU/CSU's only remaining national body, the joint 
caucus, he organized a powerful parliamentary apparatus and insisted 
upon strong voting discipline. He distributed important leadership posts 
within the caucus widely among his chief rivals, both to gain their 
loyalty and to contain th eir ambitions. Important decisions were made 
in the caucus by an inner group of parliamentarians called the Council 
of Eleven, dominated by Barzel. 0 
As Barzel gained strength and Kiesinger lost ground, so too did the 
power of the caucus increase compared to that of the extra-parliamentary 
party, despite det ermined efforts to expand the latter's role. An organi-
zational expert was hired to plan new personnel policies and opera-
tional procedures, a central membership card index was finally begun, 
4 Koiner Stadt-Anzeiger, June 9, 1973. 
5 Werner Kaltefleiter, "Zwischen Konsens und Krise," Verfassung und Ver-
fassungswirklichkeit, Jahrbuch 1973, Tei! I, 38. 
6 Geoffrey Pridham, "The CDU/CSU Opposition in West Germany, 1969-1972: 
A Party in Search of an Organization," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 
( Spring, 1973), 209. 
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a recruitment drive temporarily tripled the number of dues paying 
members, and a new party headquarters building was constructed in 
Bonn.7 But any fundamental reform might have threatened the delicate 
balance of interests within the party and thereby endanger its unity. 
In addition, regional party notables were reluctant to grant increased 
power to the national headquarters. In fact, the entire extra-parliamen-
tary organization remained disorganized and demoralized by repeated 
electoral reverses. 
As Kiesinger's political power declined , Barzel's new intra-party rival 
emerged in the person of Helmut Kohl, Minister-President in the state 
of Rheinland-Pfalz, who, although not a member of the Bundestag, 
hoped to assume the party chairmanship as a stepping stone to the 
greatest prize of all, the nomination for the chancellorship. He appealed 
to the party "reformers" and to the fears of many party members that 
Barze! might return to the Adenauer pattern. As a means of overcom-
ing Barzel's power base in the caucus , Kohl, voicing the pluralist position, 
argued for a greater role for the extra-parliamentary party , utilizing the 
familiar arguments of greater democracy, more participation, over-
throwing the old oligarchy , etc. etc. He demanded that the party and 
caucus chairmanships be separated, to avoid the concentration of power 
in a single individual holding both offices.8 He also demanded that the 
party's chancellor candidate be named by the party congress, rather 
than by the legislative caucus. It was the task of the extra-parliamentary 
organization , he argued , to mold the party's general political goals; the 
parliamentary deputi es should be charged with executing the party's 
broad programmatic commitment. 9 This, of course , is an argument that 
plagues most European parties of the democratic left, but is rather 
foreign to the theory and practice of parties of the center and right. 
But in 1971, delegates to the CDU's annual congress responded in-
stead to the need for clear, unified leadership , and elected Barzel to 
replace Kiesinger as party chairman. (Not incidentally, many of the 
delegates to the Congress were also members of the parliamentary 
caucus.) With another General Election drawing near, the Congress ac-
cepted Barzel's argument that during campaigns all individuals and 
offices within a democratic party organization must be subordinated 
to the needs of the candidate , who must in tum speak for the party 
in the only available national forum, the legislative chambers. Barzel 
now led both the CDU and the joint caucus. 
1 Ibid., p. 210. 
8 The pro s and cons of separating the two leadership positions are discussed 
at length in Kaltefleiter, pp. 40-45. 
9 Der Spiegel, January 22, 1973. 
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One more step remained, however, before Barzel, as the acknowl-
edged spokesman for both the CDU and the CSU, could challenge the 
Government of the then-Chancellor Willy Brandt. It is conceivable that 
the party congresses of the CDU and the CSU, meeting separately or 
jointly could agree upon a single candidate for the chancellorship. In prac-
tice, however, the matter has been settled in the joint caucus, where the 
CSU ( which presently means Franz Josef Strauss) can play the role 
of kingmaker, demanding substantial concessions in return for its 
endorsement of a common candidate. And, true to form, Strauss did 
delay final caucus approval of Barzefs nomination for some weeks. 
Strauss demanded lengthy negotiations, unprecedented in the history 
of the CDU /CSU, during which an ad hoc joint commission would draw 
up a program, construct a shadow cabinet, and finally name a chancellor 
candidate. Only in November, 1971, after considerable damage to Bar-
zel's public position, did Strauss bow to the inevitable and agree to 
accept the CDU leader as the Chancellor designate of the CDU /CSU 
... but a candidate clearly at the mercy of Strauss and the conservative 
forces in the caucus. 
But Bru:zel's difficulties with Strauss were still unresolved. In May 
of 1972, only a few months before the General Election, the Chancellor 
nominee was compelled to bow to pressure from Strauss and the party's 
right wing on the issue of Ostpolitik. He had to abandon his earlier 
recommendation that the caucus vote "yes" on a treaty with the German 
Democratic Republic, and to agree that the caucus members should 
simply abstain from voting. Even the pro-CDU newspapers in the 
Federal Republic comment ed editorially that the CDU/CSU's course 
appeared to be set in Bavaria, Strauss' stronghold, rather than in the 
Federal capitol. 
Unfortunately for Barzel's ambitions, he was unable to lead the 
CDU /CSU to victory in the 1972 election. And, like Kiesinger before 
him, his failure to gain the chancellorship meant loss of his party leader-
ship positions. His rivals, especially Strauss, immediately blamed him 
for the defeat at the polls. Apparently there was some justification for 
this; public opinion polls taken before the election revealed that even 
CDU /CSU supporters rated Brandt over Barzel by a substantial margin. 
After the election the CDU's own election analysts estimated that Barzel 
cost the party 4% of its potential votes.10 
For a short time it appeared that the conflict over personalities and 
policies might even result in the break-up of the joint caucus, although 
that was avoided when the moderates in both the CDU and CSU pre-
10 Ibid. 
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vailed. 11 In January, 1973 Kohl formally declared himself a candidate 
for the party chairmanship and renewed his argument that the chair-
manships of the party and of the caucus should not be held by a single 
person. In May, 1973 Barzel chose to resign as caucus chairman when 
his fellow deputies in effect declared their lack of confidence in him by 
rejecting his recommendation that they vote in favor of German member-
ship in the United Nations. 12 Soon after, he gave up the party chairman-
ship as well. 
This time, Kohl got his wish. It was, in a sense, a repetition of events 
after the 1969 defeat. Karl Carstens replaced Barzel as leader of the 
caucus and Kohl was elected party chairman by the CDU congress in 
1973. The duality of 1969-71, when Barzel led the caucus and Kiesinger 
the party, was reconstructed. Immediately the old rivalry reappeared, 
and remains unresolved today. Neither Carstens nor Kohl regards him-
self as an interim incumbent. Both appeared to have serious hopes of 
leading the CDU /CSU in the next national campaign. 
As in Barzel's case, the role of parliamentary leader offers Carstens 
many chances to demonstrate his leadership qualities. Although he has 
not been conspicuously successful in exploiting these opportunities, the 
majority of the caucus appears determined to support him, since attacks 
upon Carstens weaken the caucus in its struggle to retain its autonomy 
vis-a-vis the paity headquarters. 13 
For Kohl, leadership of the party :finally offers a national role and 
platform from which to campaign for the nomination. He has reduced 
the authority and influence of Carstens over the staff of experts work-
ing for the caucus and party. And he has also insisted that the party 
should proceed with its proper task of setting long-term goals. In 
practice, this has proved difficult; specific policy commitments are al-
most certain to threaten one or more of the important interest groups 
nominally supporting the party. Similarly, Kohl's demand that the party 
participate actively in the legislative work of the caucus has met 
vigorous resistance. 
And, once again, it is Strauss of the CSU who is playing upon the 
divisions within the CDU. He offers assistance first to one CDU leader, 
then another, but does not hesitate to denigrate his rivals publicly. His 
is a strategy of delay; throughout 1974 he resisted Kohl's efforts to be 
named the chancellor candidate of both parties. And the strategy may 
11 Frankfurter Rundschau, December 6, 1972. 
12 The majority of the caucus voted no because the bill implied approval of the 
entry of both the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic 
into the UN. New York Times, May 10, 1973. 
1s Der Spiegel, February 10, 1975. 
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work: Strauss led the CSU to a huge victory in last fall's Bavarian state 
election, thus strengthening his claim for serious consideration as a chan-
cellor candidate. 14 Kohl's failure to win a comparable margin of victory 
in his own state election in Rheinland-Pfalz on March 9, 1975, made 
it difficult for the CDU to deny Strauss the opportunity to challenge 
Schmidt the next year. 15 
Strauss projects the image of the strong man who can deal with the 
approaching social and economic crisis-unemployment, the energy prob-
lem and inflation. He decries the lack of law and order, the power of the 
trade unions, and the alleged weakness of the Government in the face 
of the persistent "Red Menace." He appeals to the inner-most fears of 
the citizens of a prosperous but vulnerable country. The greater portion 
of the CSU's gains last fall were among the upwardly mobile but 
politically unstable urban middle classes.16 
The CDU /CSU confronts a very difficult task as long as it remains a 
dual party. But the simple surgical procedure of cutting the CDU /CSU 
caucus into its components would produce even worse consequences. 
If the joint caucus collapses, the CDU will have to organize in Bavaria 
and the CSU in tum will attempt to establish itself as a fourth nation-
wide party. The more moderate leaders in both camps recognize the 
dangers: a reform-minded CDU would be competing with a national-
conservative CSU throughout the Federal Republic. Any hope that the 
CDU might have of gaining an absolute majority in a national election 
would vanish; for its part, the CSU, realistically, could hope for little 
more than to establish itself as a right-wing minority party. Quite 
possibly, a split between the CDU and CSU could begin the process of 
replacing West Germany's aggregative 2½ parties with a splintered 
multi-party system. 
Little more than a year away from another General Election, the 
CDU /CSU was still without a candidate for Chancellor. More than 
five years after leaving national office no acceptable arrangement has 
evolved to provide coherent and stable leadership. No lasting resolution 
of the basic problem of who speaks for the opposition has been achieved. 
Effective power is divided between the caucus on the one hand, and 
the two extra-parliamentary parties on the other; and the boundaries 
between these bodies are poorly defined. For a major party, or parties 
if they decide to go their separate ways, functioning within the institu-
14 The CSU won an unprecedented 62.1 % of the popular vote in the Bavarian 
state election, October 27, 1974. The German Tribune, February 13, 1975. 
15 Kohl and the CDU mustered 53% of the vote in Rheinland-Pfalz, which was 
less than his supporters had projected. New York Ttmes, March 10, 1975. 
16 Der Spiegel, November 4, 1974. 
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tional arrangements of a parliam entary system, surely this degree of 
fragmentation , of incoherence, of decentralization are demonstrations of 
weakness, not strength , of immobility, not firmness. Most definitely, the 
present pattern of decision-making is not elitist; pluralistic elites and 
groups threaten the percarious unity which the CDU /CSU's role as the 
opposition demands. 
In fact , the CDU appears to have become almost schizophrenic on 
the subject of leadership. On the one hand, it is fearful of falling once 
~gain under the control of a powerful personality. In that sense, the 
ghost of Adenauer still haunts the party. Apparently the CDU will not 
accept dynamic leadership except under desperate circumstances. On 
the other hand , effective leadership is almost certainly a key variable in 
its pursuit of power. The personalization of politics in moder democracies 
demands the strong leader, and this in turn means that the position of 
caucus and party chairmen should be combined with that of the chan-
cellor candidate. This does not imply a "personality cult"; it is quite 
simply a political necessity. In a parliamentary system it is the leader 
of the legislative opposition who must present the image of Chancellor-
to-be. It is he who presents to the voting public an alternative program 
during important debates and confrontations with the Government. It 
is he who must create majorities and reconcile conflicts among his fellow 
parliamentarians. And, not least important , if this role of the opposition 
leader is to be an effective one, the CDU must resolve its ambiguous 
attitude toward its own leadership if it is to defend itself from repeated 
encroachments by the CSU's Strauss. Paradoxically, the CDU /CSU 
must provide strong leadership within a system of democratic institu-
tions and norms; if it cannot , the public will look for such leadership 
elsewhere. 
